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COMMENT 
IS EQUALITY A TOTALLY EMPTY IDEA? 
Anthony D'Amato * 
Professor Peter Westen's essay asserting that the concept of 
equality has no substantive content whatsoever usefully brushes 
aside much of the equal-protection rhetoric that, as Westen carefully 
explains, appropriately belongs to substantive due process.• How-
ever, his absolutist position is open to challenge. I would like to 
posit one hypothetical case that I used in my classes when I taught 
Constitutional Law that I think contradicts Professor Westen's the-
sis. If it does, then there will be other cases as well, and his position 
cannot stand as the logically tight construct that he repeatedly asserts 
that it is. 
I. A HYPOTHETICAL CASE 
Let us suppose that a state legislature decides to restrict motor-
ists' use of gasoline by enacting a statute allowing drivers to 
purchase gasoline only on weekdays if their license plate is odd-
numbered and only on weekends if their license plate is even-num-
bered. The even-numbered drivers, constituting about half the mo-
torists in the state, will thus effectively be restricted to purchasing 
gasoline on Saturdays, or in other words will have one fifth the op-
portunity to purchase of the drivers who have odd-numbered plates. 
We can assume that this statute is not an attempt to reduce lines at 
service stations (actual statutes have done this by, for example, al-
lowing odd-numbered plates to purchase gasoline on odd-numbered 
days), but rather to cut down on total gasoline consumption. We can 
further assume that the legislature calculated that the great difficulty 
of purchase now imposed upon even-numbered drivers will reduce 
total gasoline consumption by the desired amount in that state. 
Suppose now that the even-numbered drivers bring a class-action 
suit to declare the statute unconstitutional. Have they been denied 
substantive due process? No, because the means selected by the leg-
islature to reduce gasoline consumption is rationally related to its 
goal. In fact, it is probably cheaper than the alternative of issuing 
ration points to all drivers. Moreover, since the legislature could 
• Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law. A.B. 1958, Cornell Univer-
sity; J.D. 1961, Harvard University; Ph.D. 1968, Columbia University. - Ed. 
I. Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982). 
600 
January 1983] Equality Empty Idea? 601 
have stopped the sale of gasoline in the state entirely, cutting back on 
sales by the means chosen was well within the legislature's power. 
Instead, the only real complaint that the even-numbered drivers 
have is that they have not been treated equally with the odd-num-
bered drivers. Here one can imagine Professor Westen saying, "But 
they are not equal - they are different in precisely the difference 
articulated by the legislature, namely, that they possess license plates 
that are divisible by 2 whereas the other drivers do not possess such 
plates." To be sure, this is, logically speaking, a difference. But the 
fact is that the "difference" selected by the legislature was a random 
one; it was arbitrary.2 If people are subject to arbitrary classifica-
tions, they are not being treated equally. Only if the classifications 
are nonarbitrary can we agree with Professor Westen that the 
"equality" rhetoric falls out, because then the classification defines 
the relevant difference such that the two groups should now be 
treated "unalike." 
If the foregoing example contradicts Professor Westen's thesis, 
then elaborating it along his lines will worsen the situation and 
demonstrate the consequences of his mode of analysis. Accordingly, 
let us elaborate upon the hypothetical case by positing some legisla-
tive history that explains why the even-numbered drivers were rele-
gated to the weekends. Suppose that a bill proposing a statute such 
as the one that was passed was circulated among members of the 
legislature, and suppose further that those members of the legislature 
who owned automobiles were split among even-numbered and odd-
numbered license-plate owners. Sensing that a bill may be passed in 
the next session of the legislature, the solons whose plates are even-
numbered apply to the Registry of Motor Vehicles for new, odd-
numbered plates. When all of them have received their new plates, 
so that now all legislators have odd-numbered plates, the bill is en-
acted into law.3 Now we have a real reason for the difference be-
tween odd and even. According to Professor Westen, such a reason 
is the key to why equality analysis is purely formal, since it explains 
that this legislative classification, like all others, defines the differ-
ences between people. But this is precisely what is wrong with his 
analysis. For while this is an explanation, it does not help take the 
case out of the Equal Protection Clause. Rather, it puts it even more 
solidly within that clause.4 
2. Of course, not all random or arbitrary statutes are violative of substantive due process, 
for example, a statewide lottery allowing gasoline purchases to the lucky numbers drawn out 
of a hat, with all motorists having an equal chance. 
3. This hypothetical extension is a variant of Professor Westen's co=ent on Morey v . 
.Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957), that a distinction could have been the greater "lobbying power" of 
American Express. Westen, supra note I, at 576. (Morey was overruled by New Orleans v . 
.Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976)). 
4. It is not a violation of substantive due process for the legislators to favor themselves; 
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II. Is THERE A DIFFERENT NORMATIVE STANDARD ANTERIOR 
TO EQUALITY! 
Professor Westen has responded to the hypothetical case that I 
have presented in the first Part of this paper by formulating a pre-
scriptive standard that he believes is logically anterior to any concept 
of equality: 
The state shall not pursue its ends by imposing a great burden on one 
class of persons where it could fully achieve its ends by imposing a 
considerably lesser burden on that or another class of persons.5 
However, his standard is not, and cannot be, a logical presupposition 
of the idea of equality. 
To simplify the analysis, let us assign a burden of 5 to my class of 
drivers with even-numbered license plates, representing the five days 
of the week that they cannot purchase gasoline, and a burden of 1 to 
the odd-numbered class. Professor Westen's standard would require 
a reduction on the burden of the even class by, for example, lowering 
it from 5 to 2. But then, in order to fully achieve the state's ends of a 
reduction in the availability of gasoline, there must be an increase on 
the odd class from 1 to 4. Thus: 
Original hypothetical: 
5 (even class) + 1 (odd class) = 6 
Westen".r standard, first application: 
2 (even class) + 4 (odd class) = 6 
However, it is now apparent upon inspection that the new ar-
rangement continues to violate the Westen standard, although from 
the opposite direction. We must apply the standard again, this time 
reducing the burden on the odd class and increasing it on the even 
class. If we had no idea of the concept of equality, we would be 
required to continue applying the standard indefinitely, until at some 
point we would hit upon an equilibrium position where there can be 
no further violation of the statutory standard: 
Westen standard, final application: 
3 (even class) + 3 (odd class) = 6 
In brief, the concept of equality is inherent in Westen's standard. 
The standard is simply a cumbersome way of saying that the two 
classes of persons must receive equal protection under the law. 
Yet one might object that the procedure of successive applica-
tions of the standard until equality is reached shows that the stan-
dard is anterior to the concept of equality. This objection cannot be 
maintained, however, due to a hidden assumption in the very proce-
suppose the statute exempted all legislators (because of the public nature of their duties) from 
the odd-even restrictions. Thus, in my hypothetical, the reason the legislators voted for the 
odd numbers was sufficient but not necessary. 
5. Westen, The Meaning of Equality in Law, Science, Math, and Morals: A Reply, 81 MICH, 
L. REv. 604 (1983). 
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dure I described of successive applications of the standard. For the 
only way we know what direction to move in making reductions and 
increases in burdens is to have a concept of equality in mind. The 
only way we can know that one burden is "great" and another bur-
den is "considerably lesser," to use the words in Professor Westen's 
standard, is to compare the burdens. But comparison presupposes a 
measure of equality, for we cannot know that one burden is greater 
than another unless we first have a concept of when the two burdens 
are equal.6 
Professor Westen's standard, therefore, is logically posterior to 
the concept of equality. If we start with the Equal Protection Clause, 
then a standard such as Professor Westen's,7 which he attempts to 
ground in substantive due process, 8 can be given operative content. 
Professor Westen's analysis is provocative and extremely useful. 
It serves the legal profession by employing recent analytical tools 
developed by philosophers of language. However, as the exchange 
in this Review may evidence, his first essay was not, contrary to his 
claim, the "last analysis."9 
6. More precisely, to compare the magnitude of any two sets, place their members into 
one-to-one correspondence. When this procedure exhausts the members of one set, then that 
set is equal to the part of the other set that has been exhausted, with the remaining members of 
the latter set constituting the amount by which the latter set exceeds the former. If at the point 
of exhaustion of the first set the second set is also exhausted, the two sets are equal. 
7. Any variation in Professor Westen's suggested standard that might avoid the terms 
"greater'' or "lesser," and yet still apply to my hypothetical case, would also presuppose the 
concept of equality. For instance, if the burdens are imposed "proportionately upon all af-
fected classes of persons," proportionality cannot be determined without first defining the 
mathematical-logical relation of e9.uality. 
8. Westen, supra note 5, at 649. The Supreme Court used the Equal Protection Clause of 
the fourteenth amendment to give content to the Due Process Clause of the fifth amendment in 
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), invalidating public school discrimination in the District 
of Columbia. Sees. WASBY, A. D'AMATO & R. METRAILER, DESEGREGATION FROM BROWN 
TO ALEXANDER 82-83, 100, 455 n.48 (1977). 
9. Westen, supra note 1, at 577 n.136. 
